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Abstract
Scarce storage capacity and distortions in access to gas storage are
considered causes of market foreclosure in liberalized gas markets. We
consider rules currently adopted in Europe for storage rationing and pro-
pose eﬃcient rationing mechanism based on the value of storage, when
other ﬂexibility inputs are available. Firstly we analyse productive ef-
ﬁciency issues neglecting vertical restraints and strategic behaviour in
the ﬁnal market. Then we assume imperfect compettion in the down-
stream market for gas supplies, given the avaialbility of storage capacity
upstream. We consider eﬀciency issues in a two stage model comparing
regulated storage tariﬀs – coupled with a centralizedrationing mechanism
– with storage auctions. Finally we consider as an optimal mechanism the
allocation of storage arising from welfare maximization by a social plan-
ner. We ﬁnd that it is usually optimal to maximize the amount of storage
capacity allocated to new entrants in the gas markets. Storage auctions
deviates from the optimal mechanism, but still improve eﬀciency, with
respect to current mechanisms, to the extent that they allocate storage
according to its value. Furthermore storage allocation appear to be an
extremeley powerful mechanism to improve competition and eﬃciency in
gas markets.
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1 Introduction
A particular feature that diﬀerentiates natural gas from electricity is the op-
portunity of storage to cope with demand ﬂuctuactions. Gas consumption is
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1aﬀected by predictable and unpredictable ﬂuctuactions. Seasonal ﬂuctuactions
are the most important but also weekly and intra-day changes are non negli-
gible. Utilities need to constantly balance demand and supply (which might
be ﬂat). Access to storage gives suppliers the ﬂexibility needed to cope with
demand ﬂuctuactions and uncertainty. Moreover as storage activities generally
imply gas injections when prices are lower (summer) and gas witdrawal when
prices are higher (winter), gas suppliers, through storage, can proﬁt from a
winter-summer spread. Further spreads may be cashed by using storage as a
ﬁnancial option for short term cycles of injection-withdrawal to speculate on
gas prices ﬂuctuactions, provided spot and future markets for the commodity
are liquid enough. But storage may also be useful to limit supply shortages in
importing Countries exposed to the risk of supply failures from non-EU Coun-
tries. Denamrk and Italy for example dispose of huge reserves of gas that are
especially locked for this purpose (strategic storage). Seasonal storage is also
used by utilities to satisfy public service obligations to the extent that house-
holds must be protected by supply shocks and are given priority with respect
to other customers. Finally storage is also used by gas producers for supply op-
timisation and by the transmission system operator to keep physical balancing
into the transmission network1.
Before the liberalization of European gas markets, storage was used by ver-
tically integrated utilities to optimize the size of the transmission network in
the long run and to eﬃciently manage gas ﬂows in the short run2. After lib-
eralization new entrants in the gas markets, beyond access to the transmission
network, should also gain access to storage capacity in order to supply gas to
their customers. In fact any supply failure would become a threat to their repu-
tation as gas sellers. Therefore the lack of storage capacity available to new gas
suppliers can be a barrier to entry3 According to the last enquiry carried out by
the European Commision on the energy sector (European Commission, 2006),
distortions in access to gas storage represent one of the main cause of market
forclosure preventing competition progress in wholesale and retail gas markets.
The European directive 2003/55/EC requires memeber Countries to imple-
ment non discriminatory third party access to storage facilities. However, mem-
ber Countries can opt between negotiated and regulated third party access,
according to the features of national storage markets. Such a diﬀerence provi-
sion, with respect to access to transmission and distribution networks, which
should be regulated by independent authorities, can be ascribed to the economic
features of storage markets, to the extent that storage is not a natural monopoly.
Though storage costs are aﬀected by scale economies, any storage plant can
supply storage services in competition with other existing plants, as minimum
eﬃcient scale is generally far from the amount of total storage demand from
gas suppliers. However the liberalisation directives did not require divesture of
1Individual gas suppliers, as shippers, may in turn resort to storage for commercial bal-
ancing purposes, to prevent being exposed to penalties if they cause unbalances inside the
transmission network.
2The availability of storage plants avoids to ﬁt the size of the trasmission nework to peak
demand, with big savings on investments costs for pipelines. In the meantime any signiﬁcant
expansion of pipeline capacity should be coupled with some increase of storage capacity. In
the very short term pipeline capacity could also be used for storage purposes (linepack).
3In a recent analysis carried out by the ERGEG (European Regulator Group for Electricity
and Gas) most gas suppliers stated that unavailability of storage prevented them from oﬀering
some kind of contract in the downstream gas market. (ERGEG, 2010).
2existing storage assets owned by former integrated utilities, in order to introduce
storage to storage competition4. Not even ownweship or legal unbundling was
required and nowadays storage is frequently supplied by branches of the former
integrated utilities, now operating as dominant gas suppliers in the downstream
market. At present a competitive market for storage is eﬀective only in the UK5.
Most continental Countries are characterized either by de facto monopolies or
by market power in the storage sector.
However storage services are not the unique ﬂexibility source for gas sup-
pliers. Flexible production ﬁelds (oﬀering “supply swing”) and ﬂexible import
contracts may operate as a substitute for gas storage, as well as interruptible
contracts with industrial customers, access to spot market liquidity or availabil-
ity of gas ﬁred power plats (considered as “virtual storage”)6. But in practice
these storage substitutes can hardly meet the total demand for ﬂexible gas by
any supplier and are generally positively correlated with market shares and
therefore more available to incumbents than to new entrants7. According to
ERGEG (2010) access to seasonal storage is essential for fullﬁlling public service
obligations. Moreover, even if the duplication of storage plants were considered
economically viable by new entrants, it would require suitable sites and a long
time span to carry out new investments. Therefore in practice even if storage is
not a natural monopoly it stils represents an essential facility8 for downstream
competition in most gas markets all over Europe.
Once we consider existing storage plants as essential facilities the need to
regulate access prices ex-ante follows, as non discriminatory third party access
(from now onwards TPA) – implemented through negotiated tariﬀs – may not
be suﬃcient to control market power9. However, standard cost reﬂective tariﬀs
may not give appropriate signals about the scarcity of storage resources. Fur-
thermore the regulatory setting should account for the availability of storage
substitutes and their asymmetric distribution among gas suppliers10. We sus-
4Before liberalisation national markets were characterized by just one or a few companies
owning multiple storage plants and European directives did not impose any horizontal un-
bundling aiming to split storage companies by selling part of their plants to new entrants,
as was done in the case of electricity generation. In the UK divesture of existing storage
plants owned by the incumbent was requested by the Monopoly and Merger Commission,
but opposed by the British Government (Yarow, 2003). Divesture was required only ex-post
in some antitrust cases by competition authorities. An example is a Merger Case (Case No
COMP/M.3868-DONG/Elsam/Energi E2) whereby the DG Competition approved a Merger
by Dong, the state owned Danish gas company, but imposed divesture of two storage plants
as a remedy to protect competition in the energy market.
5In the UK ownership unbundling has been implemented and multiple storage compa-
nies operate their business independently from gas supply, under the supervision of antitrust
authorities.
6Moreover the nature of most ﬂexibility inputs is such that a market for ﬂexibility is hard
to deﬁne. See for example Ofgem (2002); Commission of the European Communities (2006).
7Flexible production ﬁelds are availble just in gas producing Countries like the UK and
The Netherlands. An enquiry carried out jointly by the National Competiton Authority and
the Italian Energy Regulator has shown the extensive resort of ENI – the dominant ﬁrm – to
the ﬂexibility available in his import contracts in order to cope with demand ﬂuctuactions. An
opportunity not available to new entrants (Autorit` a Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato,
2009). An empirical analysis extended to the Italian Market for ﬂexibility has shown that
according to the opinion of most gas suppliers regulated storage services represent the less
expensive ﬂexibility inputs (Bonacina et al., 2009).
8See Cavaliere (2009) for a discussion of an essential facility test applied to storage markets.
9At present storage tariﬀs are regulated just in Hungary, Italy and Spain. Empirical
evidence shows that negotiated tariﬀs are much more higher than regulated tariﬀs.
10The need to consider the availability of storage substitutes beyond the degree of concen-
3pect that current tariﬀ regulation and current allocation rules hardly meet this
criterion.
In most European Countries – with the exception of the UK, France and
Hungary – the market for storage is aﬀected by persisting capacity constraints
(ERGEG, 2010) and storage scarcity is even expected to increase in the future11.
The most recent inquiry carried out by European Commission (2006) has also
found that access to storage is foreclosed by long term reservations and capacity
hoarding. In fact, due to the absence of “used-it-or-lose-it” provisions, booked
storage in some cases was not even fully utilized12.
Even if storage scarcity is frequently linked to the absence or slowness of
new investments, we think that it may be due also to the ineﬃcient access rules
currently adopted all over Europe. Though in some Countries market mecha-
nism like auctions are being used, in many cases rationing rules like “Fist Come
First Served” (FCFS), “Pro-quota” and “Capacity Goes with the Customers”
(CGWC) are still widespread. Rules like FCFS may easily induce capacity
hoarding. “Pro-quota” and “CGWC” allocates storage capacity according the
market share of gas suppliers in the downstream market for gas, and then seems
to be more fair. However neither of these rules appears to be eﬃcient,.to the
extent that storage capacity is not allocated according to its value for single
gas suppliers. Market mechanism like auctions should work better in this re-
spect, although their eﬃciency may be aﬀected by the strategic behaviour of
dominanat gas suppliers when bidding for storage capacity.
The resort to storage auctions to replace cost based regulation of storage
tariﬀs has been considered by Yarow (2003) with respect to the UK experience.
To the extent that individual demand for storage is characterized by diﬀerent
price elasticities, regulation improvements based on the use of Ramsey Pricing
may be suggested. However in the case of the storage market demand informa-
tion by the regulator is lacking, to the extent that storage is an intermediate
input demanded by gas suppliers13. Then auctions may work better in this
respect to the extent they help information discovery about the willingness to
pay for storage. Moreover storage auctions may provide information also about
the total amount of storage capacity needed and that can be ﬁnanced through
the market. Storage auction may then facilitate the transition from regulation
to competition in the storage market, as actually shown by the UK case.
The economic literature on gas storage traditionally considers the eﬀects of
storage decisions on ﬁnal gas prices, assuming that a competitive and liquid
market for the commodity is in place. Extensions to industrial organization
tration in local storage markets has also been recognized by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) in the USA (FERC, 2005), in order to assess market power when storage
companies ask for an exemption from regulated tariﬀs, claiming they operate in a competitive
storage market.
11Recent forecasts concerning North-Western Europe (Hoﬄer and Kubler, 2006) show that a
storage gap is going to aﬀect the whole region in ten years, due also to the expected decrease of
national production in the UK anf the Netherlands. The Storage gap could be even wider than
expected if the increasing import dependency led more Countries to devote storage capacity
to precautionary inventories.
12The inquiry has found that most of the storage from the sample which is fully booked
has been more than 95% full at the beginning of winter (in the period from January 2003 to
mid-2005). In some cases however less than 90% of capacity has actually been used (European
Commission, 2006, p. 65).
13Ramsey pricing may in fact implemted more easily as far as regulation of ﬁnal consumer
prices is at stake, to the extent that consumer demand elasticities are well known.
4and regulatory issues are very recent. One can see Baranes et al. (2011) for
a detailed survey. The contributions collected in Cret` ı (2009) especially focus
on the economics of gas storage from a European point of view. More recently
Ejarque (2011) has considered the cost of blocking gas reserves for precaution-
ary purposes in order to pursue security of supply. Both blocking inventories
for precautionary purposes and limiting access to storage by ineﬃcient rationing
rules prevents gas suppliers from exploiting the arbitrage opportunities given by
gas storage. Baranes et al. (2009) analyse the strategic use of storage facilities to
gain market power. To the best of our knowledge regulatory issues concerning
access to storage capacity with imperfect competition in gas market have not
been considered so far. In Bertoletti et al. (2008); Cavaliere (2009) we focused
on regulatory issues by considering both the existence of storage substitutes and
the eﬃciency of rationing rules not only per s` e but also with reference to the
distortions induced on the downstream market. In this paper we extend our
analysis with alternative assumptions about the the technology of gas supply
and assume that not only dominant ﬁrms but also new entrants dispose of stor-
age substitutes, whose amount and cost may vary. Moreover we extend welfare
analysis in order to compare the results of storage auction with storage alloca-
tions that would be chosen by a benevolent dictator as a benchmark (though
still assuming imperfect competition in the ﬁnal gas market).
In section two we consider the eﬀects of storage rationing on productive
eﬃciency both in the case of imperfect and perfect susbstitution between stor-
age and alternative ﬂexibility inputs. In section three we consider allocative
eﬃciency in a two stage model where ﬁrstly storage is rationed and then gas
suppliers compete in the downstream market. We compare market equilibrium
in a dominant ﬁrm model assuming both a centralized allocation of storage by
generic rationing rules and storage auctions. In section four we carry out wel-
fare analysis by considering as a benchmark the allocation of storage resulting
from welfare maximisation by a benevolent dictator, to compared it with storage
auctions and pro-quota mechanisms. Some conclusions follow in section ﬁve.
2 Rationing, Productive Eﬃciency and Shadow
Price of Storage
In this section we concentrate on the eﬀects of storage rationing on the produc-
tive eﬃciency of gas suppliers, without considering the strategic eﬀects due to
imperfect competition in the downstream market for gas supplies. We assume
that access to storage is regulated. Regulation concerns both the price of storage
and the allocation of storage capacity. We suppose that price regulation consist
in setting storage tariﬀs that reﬂect storage costs.coupled with a non-speciﬁed
rationed mechanism. The latter is implemented by the regulator in order to
manage capacity constraints. As in Bertoletti et al. (2008), we derive eﬃcient
rationing rules in this framework by considering the shadow price of storage.
Concerning the technology of gas supplies, we assume that “supply ﬂexibil-
ity” is the unique input needed to sell gas (we then neglect access to the trans-
mission and distribution networks). Flexibility derives from alternative ways to
procure the commodity (by ﬂexible production ﬁelds or ﬂat import contracts)
and to supply the market (ﬂexibility is increased by selling gas trough inter-
5ruptible contracts). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that ﬂexibility must
be acquired in the same amount of the ﬁnal output, indicated by y Flexibility
can be obtained according to a (well-behaved) sub-production function whose
intermediate inputs are indicated by the vector x, and that each input xi has
a unit price of wi. Though a true market for ﬂexibility is hard to deﬁne in
practice we assume that the speciﬁcity of ﬂexibility tools available to each ﬁrm
can be captured assuming that the unit price wi of any ﬂexibility input is pos-
sibly idiosyncratic to each ﬁrm (for example the advantage of an incumbent
can be represent by a lower cost of ﬂexibility with respect to new entrants in
a liberalized gas market) Finally, we assume that x1 is the amount of storage
capacity which is procured by the ﬁrm in a ﬁxed amount z due to capacity
constraints that induce rationing in the storage market. The price of storage
is ﬁxed and amounts to w1, corresponding to the regulated (cost-based) linear
tariﬀ for a unit of storage capacity.14 If there were no restrictions concerning
access to storage the total cost of achieving the amount y of ﬂexibility would be
represented by the following cost function:
c(w,y) = Minx{w′x s.t. f (x) ≥ y}, (1)
where f(x) is the relevant (sub-) production function. Due to the fact that the
amount of storage capacity is ﬁxed, the total cost of ﬂexibility can be represented
by a ”short run” cost function that we deﬁne as the restricted total cost function
for ﬂexibility ˆ c(w,y,z):
ˆ c(w,y,z) = w1z + Minx−−1
 
w′
−1x−1 s.t.f (z,x−1) ≥ y
 
, (2)
where x−1represents the vector of all ﬂexibility inputs but storage, whose amount
is given by x1 = z. Thus we can also write the restricted total cost function in
the following way:
ˆ c(w,y,z) = w1z + ˆ c−1 (w−1,y,z). (3)
Let w∗
1(w−1,y,z) be the unit price that would induce the ﬁrm to demand
(conditionally on the output level y and prices w−1) an amount of storage
cpacity x1 = z of storage capacity (and the same amount of the other inputs
implied by (2) if it were unrestricted, i.e. if there were no rationing of storage
but its price were such to lead him to buy exactly the amount obtained when
rationing occurs. Such implicit price represents the shadow price of storage and





Since ˆ c−1(w−1,y,z) = c(w∗
1(w−1,y,z),w−1,y)−w∗
1(w−1,y,z)z, we can rewrite
the restricted total cost function (3) as:
ˆ c(w,y,z) = (w1 − w∗
1(w−1,y,z))z + c(w∗
1(w−1,y,z),w−1,y). (4)
Equation (4) allows a simple computation of the (marginal) value of storage
when capacity is rationed and access to storage is regulated. In fact, the impact
14We do not consider here the diﬀerence among space, injection capacity and withdrawal
capacity. In practice the amount of rationing may be diﬀerent for the three types of storage
capacity oﬀered to customers. Therefore rationing might might not concern space but still
persist as far as withdrawal capacity is considered.
6of a marginal increase of the amount of storage on the restricted cost function
is given by:
∂ˆ c(w,y,z)/∂z = w1 − w
∗
1(w−1,y,z).
Notice that if the shadow price for storage is higher than the regulated price,
a marginal increase of storage availability reduces total costs (the marginal
value of storage is positive). In that case the gas supplier is actually rationed
in storage. On the contrary, if the shadow price of storage is lower than the
regulated price, a marginal increase in the use of storage would lead to an
increase of marginal cost (the marginal value of storage is negative). In this last
case the gas supplier is not really rationed in storage. Therefore, even if storage
is rationed among gas suppliers, we cannot exclude that a single gas supplier
will prefer to get less storage with respect to the amount assigned to him by the
existing rationing rule. Such a rule may in fact be ineﬃcient, to the extent that it
does not consider that some suppliers may dispose of alternative ﬂexibility inputs
that may be more convenient than storage. Therefore, if we exclude strategic
behaviors, these suppliers may then ask for less storage than the existing rule
actually allows them15. On the contrary assuming that gas suppliers behave
strategically then they could take over the entire storage capacity allowed by
the existing rule in order to raise the cost of their rivals, whose shadow price is
positive and that result to be really rationed in storage.
2.1 The Eﬃcient Rationing Rule: Two Examples
Storage rationing prevents gas suppliers from adopting the optimal ﬂexibility
mix, causing then an increase of their costs. Due to these negative eﬀects
on productive eﬃciency, access to storage might be regulated with the aim to
minimize distortions in the allocation of this scarce resource to the whole gas
industry. If we neglect the vertical eﬀects of rationing rules on the ﬁnal market
for gas supply an eﬃcient rationing rule would distribute storage capacity across
ﬁrms with the aim to minimize the total cost of ﬂexibility. According to the
analysis of last section such a rationing rule could be implemented through the
equalization of the shadow price of storage across ﬁrms. In fact shadow prices
could reﬂect the heterogeneous values of storage for gas suppliers.
In order to illustrate this point, we consider two examples where ﬂexibility
is provided by two inputs, storage (x1) and a substitute (x2). Without loss
of generality for what concerns the illustration of the eﬃcient rationing rule,
we assume that in the ﬁnal market for gas two ﬁrms are present: a dominant
ﬁrm (l), and a a single follower (f), which can be thought as a competitive
fringe of symmetric suppliers. We assume that the price for the rationed input
is regulated to be the unit cost of the storage service (w1 = c), while the unit
cost of the storage substitute diﬀers across the two ﬁrms: w2l = αw2f, with
15For example in Italy storage capacity, since liberalization, has been rationed following
a pro-quota rule. Then storage requirements by gas suppliers were proportionally reduced
according to their market share in the temperature sensisitive market. The existing evidence
Autorit` a Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (2009) shows that – until recently – the
dominant ﬁrm (ENI) has always been requiring less storage capacity than its market share
entitled the ﬁrm to obtain, disposing in fact of alternative ﬂexibility inputs whose availability
was not considered by the rationing criteria. Of course it would be hard to state how much
storage capacity the dominat ﬁrm really needed and to what extent it could have given up
even greater amounts of it.
70 < α < 1, to account for a better access to the storage substitute by the
dominant ﬁrm.
Example 1 In our ﬁrst example we assume that the sub-production function
for ﬂexibility is a two-input Cobb-Douglas with constant return to scale: y = √
x1x2. Then we have c(w,y) = 2y
√
w1w2 and xi(w,y) = y
 
wj/wi. As in the
previous section we assume that x1 = z and then compute the restricted total
cost function ˆ c(w,y,z) = w1z+w2y2/z, the restricted conditional demand of the
storage substitute ˆ x2(w2,y,z) = y2/z and the restricted marginal cost function
∂ˆ c(w2,y,z)/∂y = 2w2y/z. Therefore in this case the shadow price of storage
is w∗
1(w2,y/z) = w2(y/z)2. Given the output levels, the eﬃcient rationing rule
implies the equalization of the shadow price of storage of the leader with that of
the follower, i.e., w∗
1f = w∗
1l. In the current example this task reduces to the










It is worthwhile to notice that the resulting allocation of storage capacity across
ﬁrms diﬀers with respect to the ﬁnal allocation of output, as yl/yf > zl/zf. In
fact eﬃciency requires that the ﬁrm with the worst access to the storage substitute
should be “compensated” with the allocation of a greater proportion of storage
capacity. Therefore “Pro-quota” (or “CGWC”) rules, that distribute storage
capacity in proportion to ﬁnal market shares16, cannot lead to cost minimization,
as they neglect the asymmetries across ﬁrms concerning storage substitutes. On
the contrary, eﬃcient rules require discrimination among asymmetric ﬁrms.
More capacity should indeed be allocated to ﬁrms characterized by higher costs
for the storage substitutes, in order to maximise productive eﬃciency.
Example 2 In the second example we assume that the two inputs are per-
fect substitutes: y = x1 + x2, then the cost fuction is given by c(w,y) =
Min{w1,w2}y, concerning the price of inputs we keep the same assumptions
of the ﬁrst example. Due to the fact that storage and the other ﬂexibility inputs
are perfect substitutes, the shadow price of storage is simply the price of the
storage substitues, then w∗
1l = w2l and w∗
1f = w2f. Given that w2l = αw2f, with
0 < α < 1, in order to minimize the total cost of gas suppliers storage capacity
should ﬁrstly be allocated to the follower according to its requirement: zf = yf
(for yf ≤ z) and with the aim of excluding its resort to the storage substitute,
which is more expensive. The cost of the follower will then be c(w,yf) = w1yf
Then the leader should get the residual amount of storage zl = z− yf and its
cost function will be c(w,yf,yl) = w1(z− yf) + w2l(yl − z + yf) which reduces
to: c(w,yf,y) = w2l(y − z) + w1(z− yf). As a result only the leader will be
rationed in storage. The allocation of storage capacity is eﬃcient to the extent
that storage is dstributed with the aim of minimizing the cost of ﬂexibility for
the industry. This cost amounts in fact to c(w,y) = w1z + w2l(y − z).
16This kind of rules, satisfying an intuitive fairness criterion, is often used; a possible “eq-
uity” justiﬁcation comes from the practice of it being coupled with public service obligations
that require utilities to assure gas sales to households in any event (thus, access rights to
storage capacity become proportional to the share of the household market served by each
ﬁrm).
8However, to the extent that the availability (and cost) of storage substitutes
is a private and non veriﬁable information, eﬃcient allocation rules would be
very diﬃcult to implement, due to the asymmetric information of the regulator
about the technology of each gas supplier, especially considering the idiosyn-
cratic nature of ﬂexibility costs. Gas suppliers have no incentive to report to
the regulator their amount and/or cost of storage substitutes if such a report
would reduce the amount of storage capacity allocated to them, when storages
is the cheapest input.
The eventulal distortions due to asymmetric information may be present
even when storage is not the cheapest input but there are diﬀerences in the cost
of the storage substitute and we consider the strategic eﬀects due to imperfect
competition in the downstream market. In fact a dominant ﬁrm may ﬁnt it
proﬁtable to hoard more storage capacity with respect to the amount required
by cost minimisation if such a strategy contributes to raise rival’s cost17.
The scope for a strategic demand for storage is investigated in next section.
Notice that the regulator may adopt a market mechanisms to elicit ﬁrms pref-
erences concerning storage capacity. For instance, auctions might be used as
a suitable rationing mechanism to the extent that bids depend on the willing-
ness to pay for storage capacity. But even resort to storage auctions does not
eliminate the incentive to hoard capacity in order to raise rival’s cost (see next
sections). However, with a storage auction the proﬁtability of such a strategy is
endogenous to the auction itself as the price paid for storage capacity depends
on the bids posted by gas suppliers.
3 Storage Allocation and Gas Market Equilib-
rium
We now consider the vertical relationship between storage allocation and the
equilibrium in the ﬁnal market for gas. We continue to assume that ﬂexibility
is provided by two inputs: storage (z) and a unique storage substitute (x2).
Access to storage is characterized by capacity constraints. The available storage
capacity is given by S and we normalize it to S = 1.While the price of storage
(w1) is the same for the two ﬁrms, the price of the unique storage substitute is
diﬀerent: w2f is the price for the follower, while w2l is the price for the leader.
As before we assume w2l = αw2f, with 0 < α < 1, and for the sake of simplicity
we set w2f = 1, so that w2l = α. In fact new entrants are less eﬃcient than
the dominant ﬁrm in providing the storage substitute, as the leader was already
active as an integrated monopolist in the gas industry, before liberalization.
Concerning the technology of ﬂexibility we think that a linear production
function better ﬁts the case of ﬁrms involved in gas supply. In fact provid-
ing ﬂexibility for gas sales consist in procuring gas from alternative sources.
The commodity is an homogeneous good, though gas procured from alternative
sources has diﬀerent costs Then the production function will be:
y = z + x2.
Therefore the leader’s restricted cost function will be given by ˆ cl(wl,zl,yl) =
17In practice if a new entrant has no ﬂexibility tools available but storage, then by hoarding
storage capacity the leader can prevent the follower from extending its market share.
9w1zl+w2l(yl−zl) = w1zl+α(yl−zl) for yl ≥ zl, while the restricted cost function
of the follower will be ˆ cf(wf,zf,yf) = w1zf + w2f(yf − zf) = yf − zf(1 − w1)
The linearity of the technology implies that if zf increases (given S), not only
the follower could potentially increase its output (a pro-competitive eﬀect), but
a productive eﬃciency gain also arises, due to the avoided cost of the ﬂexibility
susbstitute by the follower.
For the ﬁnal gas market we assume that the demand is linear: D(p) = a−P.
According to the dominant ﬁrm model we assume that the follower (which
represent the competitive fringe of the market) sells all its feasible output in the
down-stream market.at the price set by the leader. Then the residual demand
of the leader will be:
dl(P) = a − yf − P = a − zf − x2f − P.
3.1 Equilibrium analysis when storage tariﬀs are regu-
lated
In this ﬁrst case, we assume that third party access regulation is implemented
through a cost-reﬂective access tariﬀ coupled with any centralized allocation rule
chosen by the regulator to manage the amount of available storage capacity (be it
pro-quota or CGWC or FCFS). At this stage we just assume that any centralized
rule adopted neglects both strategic behaviour due to vertical restraints and
the eterogeneity of storage value due to the cost and availability of storage
substitutes.
We consider a two stages model. In the ﬁrst period the storage ﬁrm assigns
storage capacity according to centralized rules set by the regulatory agency,
while in the second period ﬁrms compete in the ﬁnal gas market on the basis
of the storage capacity previously obtained. Be then wR
1 the regulated price
of a unit of storage capacity (we assume wR
1 < w2l < w2f) and, being γ the
percentage of storage capacity assigned to the follower then zf = γ and zl = 1−γ
(with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1).
As the follower behaves competitively then it will sell the maximum amount
of gas that it will be able to supply: yf = zf + x2f at the price chosen by
the dominant ﬁrm. The optimal quantity of gas sold by the dominant ﬁrm,
is.the output (yl) that maximizes its proﬁt function (Π), given the amount of
gas supplied by the competitive fringe:
MaxylΠ = (a − yl − zf − x2f)yl − (w
R
1 zl + (yl − zl)α)
from the F.O.C. we obtain:
yl =
a − zf − x2f − α
2
Then the equilibrium output of the industry will be
y =
a + zf + x2f − α
2
and the equilibrium market price
P =
a − zf − x2f + α
2
10As equilibrium analysis shows, the optimal output of the dominat ﬁrm is
a decreasing function of both the amount of storage and the storage subsi-
tute available to the follower. On the contrary industry output increases (and
the market price decreases) with these amounts. Therefore ineﬃcient alloca-
tion rules that distribute storage independently of its value may potentially
strengthen dominant positions in the ﬁnal gas market. Such rules may assign
less storage capacity to followers despite the higher value they may attribute to
it becuase they lack cheaper storage substitues. Eﬃciency improvements in al-
location rules are then expected to be also pro-conmpetitive.We can also notice
that the market price is aﬀected by the cost of the storage substitute available
to the leader. This cost also aﬀects the optimal output to be sold by the leader
and industry output. Therefore more eﬀcient leaders that are able to procure
cheaper storage substitutes can increase their market share, contributing at the
same time to reduce the ﬁnal price of gas and to expand equilibrium output in
the market.
3.2 Equilibrium analysis when storage capacity is auc-
tioned
Eﬃcient rationing rules are diﬃcult to implement because of asymmetric infor-
mation between the regulator and gas suppliers about the value of storage (see
section 2). Considering the results of equilibrium analysis carried out above, one
can notice that the behaviour of the dominant ﬁrm will be aﬀected by adverse
incentives. Would the regulator distribute storage according to the reports of
gas suppliers about their ﬂexibility mix, then the dominant ﬁrm will be lead to
distort upwards the cost of its storage substitutes in order to hoard storage ca-
pacity. This would be a proﬁtable strategy to the extent that the dominant ﬁrm
could raise the cost of its rival which should substitute storage capacity with
a more expensive ﬂexibility input. The regulator would then face an adverse
selection problem.
We do not analyse the problem of regulation with asymmetric information
as storage is an intermediate input that could be allocated with a decentralized
market mechanism that could potentially provide some information about the
shape of storage demand (Yarow, 2003). To the extent that productive eﬀciency
requires that storage should be allocated according to its value for each gas
suppliers we consider auctions as a way to elicit the wilingness to pay for storage.
Non discriminatory third party access could in fact implemented also through
storage auctions still controlled by the regulator. Auctioning storage capacity
does not eliminate strategic behaviour, as the dominant ﬁrm bids could still
be distorted by its aim to hoard storage capacity in order to raise rivals’cost.
However alternative rationing mechanism (centralized and decentralized ones)
could be compared both from the point of view of market equilibrium and on
welfare grounds (see next section).
We then assume that storage capacity is rationed through a multiunit sealed
bid uniform price auction, which assigns multiple units of storage capacity to
each bidder. Through this mechanism bidders must reveal they willingness to
pay for each unit of storage capacity. Then ﬁrms, when bidding for storage,
present their demand function for access to storage capacity. Their demand
will depend on the availability and costs of storage substitutes. As a result
of the auction, the available units of storage are assigned to the highest bids,
11even though bidders will pay a uniform price (wA
1 , i.e. the unit cost of storage
capacity) equal to the lowest among the highest bids that are awarded the
available units. This price of storage arising from the auction is then expected
to be higher with respect to the regulated tariﬀ, as we suppose that the latter
just reﬂects storage costs, being independent from storage demand18.
The model develops in two steps: in the ﬁrst step storage capacity is auc-
tioned and in the second one ﬁrms compete in the gas market, given the allo-
cation of storage resulting from the auction. There is a substantial diﬀerence
in equilibrium analysis with respect to last section. To the extent that storage
capacity is no more assigned through a centralized mechanism but rather dis-
tributed with a market mecahnism, bidders are able to aﬀect the ﬁnal allocation
of storage capacity. Therefore gas suppliers can bid for storage capacity not only
with the aim of procuring an essential input for competition but also with the
scope of distorting competition in the downstream market. Therefore we shall
solve the model backwards, by ﬁnding ﬁrstly the equilibrium in the gas market
(second stage) and then considering the results of the auction mechanism (ﬁrst
stage), given the equilibrium of the second stage. Then we shall ﬁnd a sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium for the two stage game.
Concerning the second stage, straight reference can be made to the equilib-
rium values found in the previous section. Then we look for an equilibrium in
the ﬁrst stage, considering the auction mechanism, and the bidding strategies of
the two ﬁrms. The follower, given the results of competition in the gas market,
will demand the amount of storage that maximizes his proﬁts (π):
Maxyfπ =
 


























(a + α) − wA
1 − x2f, with 0 ≤ zA
f ≤ S (5)





(a + α) − zA
f − x2f, (6)
One can notice that both the demand for storage and the bid of the follower
depend on the value of storage, to the extent that the latter depends on the
availability of the storage substitute.Then rationing strorage trough auctions
can elicit the willingness to pay for storage. Moreover both the demand for
storage and the bid of the follower increase with a and α, to the extent that
these parameters aﬀect the ﬁnal price of gas in the downstream market (being
18Due to information problems we exclude that the regulator is able to implement Ramsey
Pricing for storage capacity (Yarow, 2003). More sophisticated mechanisms concerning regu-
lation with asymmetric information have been derived concerning acccess pricing in the case
of networks (Armstrong and Sappington, 2007). However even in the case of networks the
existence of rationg problems in congested points has been practically faced by resorting to
auctions (Daniel and Neuhoﬀ, 2004).
12a the reserve price for gas and α the marginal cost of gas supply for the leader).
In fact the higher the price of gas the higher the bid the follower can aﬀord to
pay within the auction)
The dominant ﬁrm takes as given the bid of the follower, anticipating that it
will demand a given storage capacity paying the uniform price resulting from the
auction. If we assume that storage is rationed for both ﬁrms (zA
f +zA
l = S ≤ y),
it is individually rational for the the leader to bid strategically in order to set
the equilibrium price of storage at a level that maximizes his proﬁts, given its
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2 (a + α) − wA
1 − x2f, the maximization program reduces to:
MaxwA










































1 − x2f = 0










Therefore if the leader wants this price to result as the equilibrium price in
the auction, he has just to bid wA∗
1 for the total amount of storage capac-
ity demanded. This equilibrium is such that we can exclude that γ = 1, (i.e
zf(wA∗
1 ) = S = 1) as in this case wA∗
1 > wA
1 (being wA
1 the bid of the follower)
which is out of the equilibrium, given the rules of this auction mechanism.
Therefore in equilibrium the leader will always get a positive amount of storage
capacity, independently of the value of α, which represents his marginal cost.
On the other hand in equilibrium the leader will never crowd out the follower
as γ = zA
f = 0 implies dΠ
dwA
1
= −1. Therefore the price the leader should pay
to exclude the follower from the auction is too high to make complete crowding
out proﬁtable strategy for the dominant ﬁrm.
Given (5) and (6), the follower and the leader will respectively obtain the





(2 − x2f), (7)
z
A∗





(1 + x2f). (8)
We can notice that in equilibrium any increase in the amount of the storage sub-
stitute available to the follower positively aﬀects the storage capacity obtained
13by the leader and reduces the share of capacity obtained by the follower. The
equilibrium amounts of storage capacity do not depends on the relative prices





as any increase in α gives rise to a corre-
sponding increase in the value of wA∗
1 (the price the leader can aﬀord to pay
within the auction increases with the price of its storage substitute, representing
its marginal cost, that in turn aﬀects the equilbrium price in the gas market),
as does any increase of the reserve price a for gas in the ﬁnal market.
The equilibrium in the ﬁnal gas market can then be derived by substituting
the amounts of storage capacity obtained by the two ﬁrms within the auction,
into the equilibrium results of the gas market (cfr. 3.1) to obtain the following


































We can notice that the equilibrium output of the industry is still increasing with
respect to the amount of storage substitute available to the follower, while the
equilibrium price is decreasing with respect to the same variable. If we compare
the amount of storage assigned to the follower by the centralized mechanism (by
assumption ﬁxed at a level γ) with the value obtained within the auction (zA∗
f ),
we can say that the auction assigns a larger amount of storage to the follower
if and only if γ ≤ 1
3 (2 − x2f).This implies that the less the storage substitute
available to the follower, the larger amount of storage will be allocated to him
within the auction. From this point of view the auction represents per se a more
eﬃcient mechanism to the extent that it allocates storage capacity considering
the availability of storage substitutes. One can also notice that, as in last section,
equilibrium output negatively depends on α and the equilibrium price positively
depends on it. Then, idependently of the allocation of storage, the more the
leader is eﬃcient in providing the storage substitute compared with the follower
(i.e. α− > 0), the more the equilibrium output of the industry increases and
the equilibrium price decreases.
4 Welfare analysis: a comparison with an opti-
mal mechanism
In this section we aim to compare alternative mechanism to regulate access to
gas storage on welfare grounds. Our approach consist in comparing both central-
ized allocation rules and storage auctions with an optimal mechanism resulting
from the maximisation of social welfare by a benevolent and omniscient dicta-
tor. However, such a mechanism represents a second best as we assume that the
benevolent dictator distributes storage capacity taking as given the existence of
14imperfect competition in the gas market. In addition storage auctions are com-
pared with a speciﬁc mechanism, which allocates storage capacity in proportion
to ﬁrms’ shares in the down-stream market (“pro-quota”). Due to the existence
of a dominant ﬁrm we explicitly consider a mechanism that assigns to the the
leader 80% of available storage capacity while the residual 20% is assigned to
the follower.We can express social welfare as the sum of the consumer surplus
in the gas market (CS) and the proﬁts obtained by the dominant ﬁrm (Π), the
follower (π) and the storage company (πS), i.e.:
W = CS + Π + π + πS.
Let us ﬁrstly consider the benchmark of the analysis which is represented
by the second best, i.e. the storage capacity allocation (expressed as the share
allocated to the follower) that would maximize social welfare, given imperfect
competition in the gas market. We consider the expression social welfare when
access to storage is allocated by a generic centralized mechanism and storage
tariﬀs reﬂect storage costs. In that case (given the results of sub-section 3.1)




a + zf + x2f − α
2





(a + γ + x2f − α)
2
and then the proﬁts obtained respectively by the market leader and by the
follower:
ΠR =
a − zf − x2f + α
2
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By adding the previous components and simplifying we obtain the expression
of social welfare to be maximised by a benevolent dictator:
WR = γ
 







8α − 6aα + 3α2 − γ2 − x2
2f − 8x2f + 2ax2f + 6αx2f + 3a2 
− c (9)
from the FOC, and the concavity of W with respect to γ, we can then obtained
the optimal share of storage capacity that should be allocated to the follower






[a − α − γ − x2f] = 0
γ
∗ = a − α − x2f, (10)
15However, the value (10) can not always be attained: in fact, γ∗ should belong
to the interval [0,1]. Therefore, remarking that dW






1 if a − α − x2f > 1
0 if a − α − x2f < 0
a − α − x2f otherwise
We remark that, the second and the third case (i.e. γ∗ < 1) need a wery low
value for a and a very large value for x2f; this cases are unlikely when trying
to describe an actual economy. Section 5 will show an example and clarify this
point.19
5 A numerical example
In this section we set the parameters’ values to reasonable amounts and present
some equilibrium results in terms of storage shares, social welfare and of its
components. Table 1 shows the parameter’s values, Table 2 presents the result-
ing equilibrium prices, quantities and welfare components. Figure 1 shows how
the social welfare depends, for diﬀerent values of x2f, on the share γ of storage
assigned to the follower. Finally, Figure 2 plots the γ yielding from an auction
on the storage market.
Some remarks.
1. First of all, we underline that, from the qualitative point of view, the
results keep valid for a fairly large range of the parameters value. We set
them to values that aim to mimick a real case.
2. The social welfare is strictly increasing in γ, with γ ∈ [0,1] (see Figure 1).
This behavior depends on the parameters’ values, but we note that to
obtain a non monotone function we need unreasonable parameters’ values,
i.e. extremely low demand (a slightly larger than one) resulting in a non
rationing role for the storage.
3. Figure 1 shows the negative eﬀect of x2f on the social welfare. This can be
explained pointing out that, when x2f = 0, the follower uses the storage
only and the leader both storage and its substitute. Instead, when x2f > 0,
the follower uses the substitute input, but in doing so, it is ineﬃcient
(w2f = 1 > w1l = α).
4. The increase of γ reduces the leader production of an amount smaller than
the increase in follower output.
19However if we focus on γ∗ = a − α − x2f, it is a local maximum if and only if a − α ≤
x2f ≤ a − α + 1. Then, according to the maximisation of social welfare, the optimal share of
storage capacity to be allocated to the follower negatively depends on x2f and on α. That is,
the less the storage substitute available to the follower and the greater its cost with respect to
the leader then the greater the share of storage capacity to be assigned to the follower in order
to maximise social welfare. In the meantime lower values of α positively aﬀects productive
eﬃciency and contribute in turn to increase social welfare. Please notice that x2f is an indirect
measure of the price elasticity of the follower demand for storage. Thus the amount of storage
capacity assigned to the follower is inversely related to the price elasticity of its demand for
storage. A result close to Ramsey Pricing (Yarow, 2003).
16Parameter value comment
S 1 The gas quantities are normalized such that S = 1
w2f 1 The substitute input for the follower is chosen as
num´ eraire
a 20 This demand function’s intercept value, toghether
with the ones of α, x2f and c below, allows to ob-
tain a regulated cost of storage to gas price ratio c
P
around 5%
α 0.75 The leader’s cost for the substitute input: this pa-
rameter is diﬃcult to measure
c 0.5 The cost of the storage for the storage company
w1 c For the regulated case, the storage price equals its
cost
x2f 0.2 The substute input available to the follower is much
smaller than the total amount of storage (S = 1)
Table 1: Calibration of parameters’ values. We underline that quantities and
values are normalized in terms of S and w1f respectively.
Regulation (γ = 0.2) Auction Second best (γ = 1)
P 10.1750 9.9750 9.7750
y 9.8250 10.0250 10.2250
yl 9.4250 9.2250 9.0250
yf 0.4 0.8 1.2
w1 0.5 9.5750 0.5
γ 0.2 0.6 1
x2l 8.6250 8.8250 9.0250
x2f 0.2 0.2 0.2
CS 48.2653 50.2503 52.2753
Π 89.0306 81.5706 81.4506
π 3.7700 2.0350 11.0300
πS 0 9.0750 0
W 141.0659 142.9309 144.7559
Table 2: Given the parameters’ values of Table 1, we compare the regulated
case with γ = 0.2, the auction case and the second best (γ = 1) case.
































Figure 1: Welfare function for x2f ranging from 0 to 1, steps 0.2. The larger
x2f, the lower the corresponding line.












Figure 2: Share γA of storage given to the follower after an auction on its market.
We compute γA for x2f ranging from 0 to 2. We remark that the second best
γ equals 1 on this range of x2f values; it lowers below 1 for unrealistically large
x2f values (note that x2f = 2, i.e. x2f = 2S, is yet extremely large).
185. From the previous points, we remark that the maximum solial welfare is
obtained with the combination γ = 1, x2f = 0.
6. From the social welfare point of view the regulated case with γ = 0.2 is
worse than the auction which in turn is worse than the regulated case with
with γ = 1. The eﬀect is clear: equilibrium gas quantity rises and price
drops.
7. The auction (or any rule assigning more storage to the follower) produces
larger welfare than the regulated case (with γ = 0.2).
8. The pro-competitive eﬀect of the auction, with respect to the regulated
case with γ = 0.2, yields a much larger γ, an increase in the total output
and then in social welfare, but the competition on the storage market
dramaticaly rises the storage price, shifting proﬁts from the leader and
follower to the storage company.
6 Conclusions
Despite the fact that storage is not a natural monopoly, competition for storage
services remains unsatisfactory in most Countries across Continental Europe.
Some Countries have adopted regulated access to storage based on cost-reﬂective
storage tariﬀs coupled with centralized rationing rule to allocate scarce storage
capacity. Most rationing rules are not based on eﬃciency criteria. Such inef-
ﬁcient rules lead to discrimination among gas suppliers to the extent that the
idyosincratic value of storage is hardly considered by them. However in this
contribution we have shown that even centralized rationing rules focused on the
values of storage and aiming to maximise productive eﬃciency may be diﬃcult
to implement due to asymmetric information about the cost of storage substi-
tutes. Such a claim was also made by Yarow (2003) when discussing capacity
auctions in the UK energy sector, concerning the diﬃcult implementation of
Ramsey pricing due to asymmetric information about the price elasticity of
storage demand by individual gas suppliers. Yarow (2003) also claimed that re-
placing centralized storage regulation with storage auctions may be worthwhile
to the extent that auctions should reveal the willingness to pay for storage.
Adopting a market mechanism for storage allocation may facilitate the transi-
tion to competition in storage with positive eﬀects also for competition in gas
markets.
However, we have also considered that the results of auctioning storage ca-
pacity may be distorted by strategic behavior, as far as the downstream market
for gas is dominated by an incumbent ﬁrm while new entrants are grouped as
a competitive fringe of gas suppliers. Imperfect competition in the downstream
market necessarily introduces distorsions in storage allocations upstream. As-
suming that storage and alternative ﬂexibility inputs are perfect subsitutes and
that the dominant ﬁrm is more eﬃcient as a gas supplier, cost miniminzation
criteria would lead to completly satisfy the demand for storage coming from
the (less eﬀcient) competitive fringe. Furthermore, if we assume that storage is
allocated by a benvolent and informed social planner aiming to maximize social
welfare, we ﬁnd that storage capacity should be completely allocated to the
competitive fringe, letting the leader supply gas by just resorting to the storage
19substitute. However, in equilibrium the storage auction never gives them the
total amount of storage capacity, implying that some capacity hoarding by the
dominant ﬁrm is at stake. In the meantime even the leader will not be assigned
the complete amount of storage. Such a strategy may in fact be too costly
even for the leader, which sets the equilibrium price of the storage auctions in
order to maximise his proﬁts in the downstream market. Despite the fact that
auctions may be distorted by the strategic behaviour of the dominant ﬁrm, and
their result deviates from the optimal allocation resulting from social welfare
maximisation, we ﬁnd that they work nicely in assigning storage capacity to the
competitive fringe in proportion to the availability of the storage substitute. To
the extent that the availability of a subsitute aﬀects the eleasticity of storage
demand, auctions reperesent a most eﬃcient mechanism with respect to pro-
quota allocation and other similar mechanisms currently adopted in Europe. In
fact, the higher the relative eﬀciency of the dominant gas supplier and the lower
the availability of storage substitutes to the competitive fringe the higher the
likelyhood that storage allocations resulting from storage auctions will improve
social welfare. Such a result seems to conﬁrm that storage auctions may be
especialy valuable during the traisition to real competition both in the mar-
ket for storage and in the commodity market. It is also worthwhile to notice
that storage allocations implemented by a benevolent social planner – though
diﬃcult in practice – highlight the crucial role that is played by storage allo-
cation with respect to the enforcement of competition in the social market to
the beneﬁts of ﬁnal consumers. Therefore, removing current vertical restraints
aﬀecting storage in the European gas market could have a dramatic eﬀect on
the reduction of dominant positions, with susbstantial beneﬁts for competition
and eﬃciency.
All over our analysis we have supposed that storage capacity is provided by
an independent ﬁrm, not involed in gas supply. If storage is on the contrary
provided by a separate branch of the dominant gas supplier, then the equilibrium
price within the storage auction is simply a transfer price from the point of view
of the vertically integrated group. Therefore actual bids may be diﬀerent from
bids resulting from the equilibrium solutions resulting from our models and
without any further regulatory intervention the extension of capacity hoarding
may be much more greater than what we ﬁnd. However in practice this problem
has been solved in the UK by adding a quantity cap to the suppliers bids, such
that no supplier can obtain more than a ﬁxed share of the auctioned storage
capacity (Hawdon and Stevens, 2001). In the meantime, our analysis suppose
that the total amount of storage capacity obtained through any mechanism is
completly used as an input to supply gas to ﬁnal consumers. Some empirical
evidence shows however that gas suppliers may even withold storage capacity
without using it as an input. We think that such an assumption could be
also incorporated in the framework of our model to see how the results change
accordingly. A further natural extension concern the change of auction rules.
for example the opportunity of introducing reserve prices and/or pay as bid as
an alternative to marginal pricing.
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